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Section Two
New Developments in the Theories
and Measurement of White and
Black Racial Attitudes
Gargi Roysircar Sodowsky
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Janet Helms in "Toward a Methodology for Measuring and Assessing
Racial as Distinguished from Ethnic Identity" proposes (a) theoretical
advancements in the Black and White racial identity models, (b) a
nontraditional psychometric understanding of the White Racial Identity
Attitudes Scale (WRIAS), and (c) assumptive differences in the constructs
of racial identity and ethnic identity. Helms has introduced new
concepts, such as, "sociorace," "racial assignment," "societally defined
racial classification system" and "societally regulated racial group," to
argue that one cannot classify people in the U.S. according to genetic
origins and phenotypes. Rather, race-defining characteristics are chosen
by the White dominant group, the group that holds the political power.
Thus, race is sociopolitically defined, and racial identity of an individual
is the internalized consequence of imposed societal categories.
Originally Helms had conceptualized racial identity as a linear,
hierarchical developmental process. She used the construct of "stages"
to describe the respective processes of U.S. Blacks and Whites who
progress from negative and hateful attitudes to positive and healthy
attitudes towards both the Black and the White racial groups. Helms has
now suggested that "ego statuses" be used instead of "stages" when
understanding a person's "racial self-conception."
An intrapsychic status process is caused by a person-environment
reactivity. But statuses' are hypothetical constructs, which cannot be
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measured. What can be measured is the individual's informationprocessing strategy, as related to one's currently predominant status.
However, different information-processing strategies may underlie each
status. Thus, two individuals governed by the same status may actually
express themselves through different information-processing strategies
(for example, in the Black Preencounter status, denial by one and
individualism in another). One cannot conclude that any single sample
of race-related behavior, as indicated by scale responses, reveals all of the
statuses that are potentially accessible to a person. That is, because a
status has differentiated to some extent in the person's ego does not mean
it will govern all of the person's responses on a measure. Helms uses a
circular diagram to represent the status profile of a person. The circle is
used to emphasize that racial identity statuses are not hierarchical, in the
sense that the use of one status does not preclude the use of another.
These ideographic and dynamic aspects of racial identity have
challenged Helms to rethink how to use her objective, Likert-type
scales. Helms argues that the basic tenets of classical measurement
theory (e.g., items need to be linearly related as in the case of internal
consistency reliability) are probably not directly applicable to the
measurement of racial identity statuses. Helms says that relationships
among items may be underrepresented if one uses unadjusted linear
methodologies to evaluate such relationships.
Helms says racial identity profiles rather than single scores should
be used to describe the individual. She has used the standard error
of the difference between two subscale scores to determine by how
many points subscale raw scores must differ in order to be significantly
different from one another. This method of developing individual
profiles is meaningful in comparison to just showing group differences,
as has been suggested by research to understand significantly different
scores between verbal and performance tests on the WISC-R, and by
Sodowsky and collaborators' use of a critical difference score between
two subscales to show differences in the worldviews of individual
Chinese subjects. Helms gives a norm table that shows the minimum
number of points by which each pair of adjacent subscales must differ
from each other to demonstrate high difference, very high difference,
or no difference. According to Helms, reliance on untransformed raw
score comparisons may contribute to misleading conclusions.
Helms has relabeled the Black Racial Identity Attitudes (BRIAS)
subscales by using a combination of Atkinson's minority identity
development (MID) model and Cross' Black racial identity labels.
Helms has also relabeled her Black racial identity model as Black and
other People of Color identity, meaning that the Black identity processes
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can be applied to "visible racial and ethnic groups" who have internalized
reactions to their respective assignments in the sociopolitical power
system. What was previously an oppression-driven, race-specific Whiteand-Black emic model is now generalized to other U.S. racial and ethnic
minority groups who have historically not experienced slavery. Prior to
Helms, Atkinson had already made the case for an etic or universal
minority identity development model (MID), and Sue and Sue had
proposed the racial! cultural identity development model. So could this
mean that there is now a meeting of two theoretically different models,
the MID model and the Black racial identity model?
Helms suggests that identity models be considered racial if they
describe reaction to racial oppression, and identity models be considered
"ethnic" if the constructs of ethnicity and common cultural socialization
as the source interconnectedness among group members are basic to
them. Helms adds that in U.S. society, acknowledgement of ethnicity is
"largely voluntary," whereas race is not, and ethnicity typically is
"permitted" to adapt itself across generations. Therefore, Helms describes
her racial identity measures as process measures which, she says, cannot be
evaluated by classical measurement theory. On the other hand,she argues,
classical measurement theory can be used to construct the content-specific
homogeneous constructs of ethnic identi ty measures. Helms' differentiation
of racial and ethnic identity models may not be supported by Bernal,
Phinney, Isajiw, Smith, Sodowsky and Kwan, and Derald Wing Sue and
Stanley Sue, all of whom refer to the effects of the White group's
domination on an ethnic person, and some of whom also refer to
different implicit ethnic identity aspects that require internal processing.
Robert T. Carter in "Exploring the Complexity of Racial Identity
Attitude Measures" examines the scale constructions of the WRIAS
and BRIAS and illuminates (a) various subscales and (b) the use of
percentile scores versus raw scores. The objective of Carter's research
appears to be to keep pace with Helms' recent theory development of
racial identity. Through content analysis, Carter groups 11 factors,
factor themes, items, and the factor loadings of the WRIAS into two
primary dimensions that he labels Racial Distance/Discomfort and
Racial Awareness/ Acceptance. Subsequently, Carter reports findings
of a cluster analysis. A two-cluster solution for the five White racial
identity subscales represented the best fit in terms of proportion of
cases in two groups. Thus, Carter argues that Helms' White racial
identity constructs of "abandoning racism" and "developing a nonracist
White identity" are discernible.
Carter advoca tes the use of transformed percentile scores from his
norm tables presented in this chapter. He reminds us of Helms'
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warning that local racial climates might influence the racial identity of
subjects and volunteer participants, which may, in fact, explain the
low sub scale reliabilities of the WRIAS and BRIAS and the varying
scale scores across samples. To justify his point, Carter transformed
the two clusters' rank-ordered WRIAS subscale mean raw scores into
percentiles, using the WRIAS norm table. When considering the rankordered raw scores instead of percentile scores, the relative influence
of the subscales is less apparent.
Carter also reports a cluster analysis of the BRIAS. A three-cluster
solution best fit the data, which, according to Carter, suggests three
underlying dimensions to Black racial identity: Pro-White, Racial
Confusion, and Racial Pride. These domains approximate Helms'
previous understanding of the properties of the BRIAS. At first glance
at the raw scores, the three clusters do not appear to be distinct from
each other, with Clusters 2 and 3 having the same rankings of mean
subscale scores. However, by using percentiles from the BRIAS norm
table, the rankings change, suggesting distinct profiles within each
cluster. Surprisingly, the pro-White cluster has its strongest influence
from Preencounter (anti-Black and pro-White attitudes), followed by
Immersion-Emersion (pro-Black and anti-White attitudes). Carter
explains that both these subscales involve stereotypical perspectives
of Blacks, which might have jointly influenced the cluster.
The first half of the chapter provides updated definitions of the
White and Black racial identity attitudes. There is a comprehensive
review of empirical research, showing how each subscale of the WRIAS
and BRIAS, respectively, has differently predicted psychological, social,
and personal ath·ibutes across samples and environments in several
studies by diverse researchers. This section and its references will be very
beneficial for future researchers of racial identity.
Sandra Choney and John Belu-ens1 in "Development of the Oklahoma
Racial Attitudes Scale Preliminary Form (ORAS-P)" first acknowledge
Janet Helms' leadership in urging researchers to investigate the racial
orientation of Whites as it may affect White-non-White interactions.
Then Choney and Belu·ens proceed to show that the ORAS-P is different
from Helms and Carter's WRIAS in (a) theory and (b) instrument
development and analyses. They end by responding to Hehns and
Carter's conclusion regarding the "factorial complexity" of the WRIAS.
Choney and Behrens emphasize that validity is demonstrated by an
extensive instrument development process, such as their envisioned
'Choney and Behrens' theoretical collaborators are Wayne Rowe and Donald Atkinson
who are referenced in the chapter.

SECTION TWO

141

undertaking for the ORAS-P, and that there is a presumption that the
WRIAS has a level of validity in Helms and Carter's argument that their
measure is factorially complex. Thus one of Choney and Behrens'
objectives in presenting the ORAS-P is to demonstrate that its factor
structure is not different from that proposed by their theory.
Choney and Behrens explain that Helms' White racial identity
development theory uses an "oppression-adaptation" construct which
is more appropriate to explain the reactions of u.s. racial and etlmic
minorities who experience oppression than to explain White racial
attitudes. It provides" developmental interpretations." Finally, it uses
the "abstraction" identity.
Calling their own model "pragmatic," Choney and Behrens say
that White racial consciousness is characterized by the "significance of
being White." The "types" of attitudes that embody the significance
of being White reflect ethnocentrism and privilege in White
relationships with minorities. Although Helms observes that Phinney
fails to distinguish between racial identity and ethnic identity, Choney
and Behrens have applied Phinney's ethnic identity concepts to
understand White etlu10centrism. Despite such theoretical differences,
it appears that the idea of "oppression" may be shared by both White
racial consciousness and White racial identity. Also, although Choney
and Behrens do not propose a developmental model, they have
utilized Phinney's and Marcia's concepts of "achieved" and
"unachieved" statuses which have developmental underpinnings.
Choney and Behrens explain attitude change from Bandura's
social learning/cognitive theory. When there is dissonance between
currently held racial attitudes and recent experiences in the
environment, this cognition-environment mismatch may lead to
changes in types of racial attitudes. The unique nature of the
"dissonant" type is that its experience is available to all types, and it
is a necessary transition experience. The central position of dissonance
is indicated by a circumplex diagram, which shows that the four
"achieved" types are blocked from each other, except when there is
movement through dissonance. The racial consciousness in the
"avoidant" and "dependent" unachieved types is low because
movement between each other does not need a dissonance experience.
This stated assumption about dissonance by Choney and Behrens
makes their conceptualization about changes in White racial attitudes
different from that conceptualized by Helms and Carter. However, it
appears the White individual in both models is practicing" adaptation"
in attitudes, in one case through a differentiating ego, and in the other
through conscious learning.
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Thus, we now have two models of White racial attitudes, each
accompanied by its own measure. The significant contribution of the
two models to multicultural assessment is that their respective
instruments permit scientific inquiry and debate, unlike many other
multicultural concepts and positions that cannot be measured.
Choney and Behrens state that their objective for consh'ucting the
ORAS-P was to provide empirical validation for their proposition of
types. They employed the deductive approach, with items designed to
measure seven predetermined constructs. Seven administrations of th,e
ORAS-P over a 3-year period permitted the study of individual item
performance, univariate and bivariate distribution of sub scale scores,
and internal consistency reliabilities. Items were modified, substituted,
or newly introduced with each administration and analyzed.
Although there are relatively few items per type, with the avoidant
type having only three items, the internal consistency reliabilities of the
subscales are moderately high. Test-retest reliabilities are similar to those
of most trait instruments. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) results
reported in this chapter indicate relatively sh'ong loadings for a majority
of the items and acceptable values for select goodness-of-fit indexes.
When the subscales for the four achieved types were collapsed into two
bipolar subscales (combined "dominitive" /"integrative" and combined
"reactive" /" conflictive"), the CFA fit for the five-factor model was worse
than the original seven-factor model. Nonetheless, Choney and Behrens
agree that their future item refinement will need to focus on further
distinction of dominitive and integrative subscales as well as the reactive
and conflictive subscales. The authors' explanation about their CFA
methods and wlderstanding of obtained results are useful information
for researchers who use factor analytic methods.
Although Choney and Behrens show that interfactor correlations
and their directions make conceptual sense, some correlations are
moderately high, raising the definitional argument of whether trait
instruments are multidimensional or unidimensional or have
overarching higher order factors that have not been psychometrically
ruled out. The authors may not have empirically shown that their
constructs' "unachieved" and "achieved" statuses are the moorings
for the various White racial consciousness types. However, given
Choney and Behrens' laudable empirical ambitions of "developing"
rather than "establishing" the ORAS-P, one expects future refinements
to address various questions. While we await new developments, the
ORAS-P's initial psychometric properties are promising.

